Constitutional Law: Privilege against Self-Incrimination: Conviction of a Non-Tax-Related Offense Secured through the Use of Federal Tax Returns: Garner v. United States by unknown
Nova Law Review
Volume 1, Issue 1 1977 Article 12
Constitutional Law: Privilege against
Self-Incrimination: Conviction of a
Non-Tax-Related Offense Secured through the
Use of Federal Tax Returns: Garner v. United
States
Copyright c©1977 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Constitutional Law: Privilege against
Self-Incrimination: Conviction of a
Non-Tax-Related Offense Secured through the
Use of Federal Tax Returns: Garner v. United
States
Abstract
Roy Garner candidly reported substantial income from illicit wagering in his 1965, 1966, and
1967 federal income tax returns.
KEYWORDS: privilege, non-tax-related
I I:97CS OMN 4
Constitutional Law: Privilege against Self-
Incrimination: Conviction of a Non-Tax-Related
Offense Secured through the Use of Federal
Tax Returns: Garner v. United States
Roy Garner candidly reported substantial income from illicit wagering
in his 1965, 1966, and 1967 federal income tax returns.' He reported his
occupation as a "professional gambler" in the 1965 return.2 Garner was
subsequently prosecuted for conspiring to violate various federal gam-
bling statutes. 3 At trial,4 the government introduced into evidence the
returns in question. Garner objected to the admission of the returns,
asserting a violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against compul-
sory self-incrimination. 5 The returns were admitted over Garner's objec-
tions, and the jury found him guilty of conspiring to violate the gam-
bling statutes.
Garneres conviction was reversed in 1972 by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.' Circuit Judge Koelsch, for the majority, held that
the disclosures Garner made in his returns were statutorily compelled
by Internal Revenue Code § 7203,7 which makes it a crime to willfully
1. A taxpayer is required to report and pay tax on his illegally derived income.
See note 16, infra. I.R.C. § 7203 makes it a crime for a taxpayer, who is required to
make a return or pay a tax, to fail to do so. See note 7, infra.
2. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 at 649-50 (1976).
3. Garner's conspiracy indictment was under 18 U.S.C. § 224 (bribery in sporting
contests effectuated through use of an interstate communication facility); § 371 (conspir-
acy to commit any offense against the United States); § 1084 (interstate transmission
of wagering information by one engaged in the business of wagering); and § 1052 (use
of an interstate facility to distribute proceeds of an unlawful activity). He was also
indicted for the substantive offense of aiding and abetting the violation of § 1084, but
he was acquitted on this count at the close of the government's case. 424 U.S. at 694
n. 1.
4. Garner was tried by a jury in the District Court for the Central District of
California.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, in part: "No person . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
6. 501 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972).
7. I.R.C. § 7203 reads, in pertinent part: "Any person required under this title to
pay any . tax to make a return. keep any records, or supply any informa-
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fail to supply required information.8 Such compelled disclosures were
held to be inadmissible as evidence in a subsequent prosecution of gam-
bling law violations because of Garner's privilege against self-
incrimination.
On rehearing en banc two years later, the Court of Appeals re-
versed itself.? Circuit Judge Wallace, a dissenter in the 1972 opinion,
now vriting for the majority, concluded that the privilege could not be
invoked at trial to protect one from disclosures voluntarily made in
previously filed tax returns. 0 Thus, if Garner had wanted the protection
of the privilege, he should have asserted it when the incriminating infor-
mation was required to be filed."
On certiorari,' 2 the Supreme Court of the United States unani-
mously affirmed the en banc determination of the Court of Appeals, 3
and held that since Garner made the disclosures in his tax returns in-
stead of claiming the privilege therein, they were not compelled and,
therefore, not protected by the privilege. 4
I. COMPULSION TO FILE A RETURN
It has been established since 1927, when the Supreme Court de-
cided United States v. Sullivan,' that the Fifth Amendment privilege
does not give a taxpayer the right to refuse to file a return because he
has an illegal source of income." In Sullivan, the defendant had been
tion, who willfully fails to pay such. . . tax, make such return, keep such records, or
supply such information. . . shall. . be guilty of a misdemeanor ..
8. 501 F.2d at 232.
9. 501 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1974). Circuit Judge Wallace wrote the opinion for the
majority, with Circuit Judge Koelsch dissenting.
10. Id. at 240.
II. id.
12. Certiorari was granted at 420 U.S. 923 (1975).
13. Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the majority. Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall concurred. Justice Stevens took no part in this case.
14. 424 U.S. at 665.
15. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
16. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that a taxpayer must report and
pay tax on illegally derived income. § 61(a) provides, in part, that "gross income means
all income from whatever source derived. . . ." The Supreme Court has interpreted this
section broadly, by including as gross income all income, whether legally or illegally
derived. See. e.g., James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (gross income includes
embezzled funds); Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (extorted funds); United
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943) (gambling receipts); United States v. Sullivan,
274 U.S. 259 (1927) (income from illicit traffic in liquor).
2
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engaged in an illicit liquor business in violation of the National Prohibi-
tion Act. 7 He was convicted of willful failure to file a federal tax return
as required by the Revenue Act of 1921,18 over his objection that, be-
cause of the illegal nature of his business, he would be compelled to
incriminate himself if he were required to file a return. The Court held
that the privilege did not protect him from the requirement of filing a
return." The Fifth Amendment might have protected him from answer-
ing incriminating questions asked in the return, but it did not give him
the right to fail completely to file a return." Although not presented
with the question, the Court suggested that a taxpayer who wants the
protection of the privilege should raise it in the return: "If the form of
the return provided called for answers that the defendant was privileged
from making he could have raised the objection in the return, but could
not on that account refuse to make any return at all."'"
In Garner," the Court cited Sullivan as establishing that a taxpayer
is compelled to file a return. Concluding that Garner was compelled to
file a return did not, however, end the Fifth Amendment inquiry. The
Court still had to determine whether Garner was compelled to incrimi-
nate himself when he could have claimed the privilege on the tax returns
in lieu of disclosing the incriminating information.2 In holding that he
had not been compelled to incriminate himself, the Court established
what had been suggested in Sullivan: Garner's failure to assert the
privilege in the returns rendered the incriminating disclosures non-
compulsory and, as such, not within the protection afforded by the Fifth
Amendment.2'
2. DISCLOSURE IN LIEU OF
ASSERTION OF THE PRIVILEGE
The Court cited United States v. Kordel as a holding squarely
supporting its conclusion that Garner lost the benefit of the privilege by
17. Act of Oct. 28, 1919, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305.
18. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 136, §§ 223(a), 253; 42 Stat. 227, 250, 268.
19. 274 U.S. at 263.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 424 U.S. at 652.
23. Id. at 653.
24. Id. at 665.
25. 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
147]1
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revealing the incriminating information, and five other cases 6 as sup-
porting this principle in dicta. The Court determined that these cases
stood for the proposition that "if a witness under compulsion to testify
makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the Government has
not 'compelled' him to incriminate himself."' '
In Kordel the defendants, who were officers of a food corporation,
were prosecuted for a violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act." Prior to the commencement of this prosecution, an in rem action
had been filed against several of the defendants' corporate products.
Pursuant to this civil action, extensive interrogatories were served on the
corporation. During the in rem action, the defendants were informed by
the government that it was contemplating a criminal prosecution against
them for violations of the Act. Rather than claiming his privilege at this
point, one of the defendants answered the interrogatories served by the
government. In the later criminal prosecution the government intro-
duced into evidence information obtained by the interrogatories. The
defendants objected to the admission of this evidence and argued that
the answers to the interrogatories had been compelled, and that their
use would violate the defendants' privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court held that the use of these answers did not violate the defen-
dants' privilege, since they had been notified of the contemplated crimi-
nal prosecution and had disclosed the information instead of claiming
the privilege. The Court, in Garner,1' read Kordel as establishing the
general rule that by volunteering information rather than asserting the
privilege, one has not been compelled to answer.
In United States v. Monia3' the defendants were charged with
conspiring to fix prices .in violation of the Sherman Act.12 Each defen-
dant appeared as a witness before the grand jury, giving testimony
substantially connected with the transaction covered by the indictment
26. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 466 (1975); Rogers v. United States, 340
U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951); Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949); United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943); Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103,
112-13 (1927), construed in Garner, supra note 2, at 653-54.
27. 424 U.S. at 653-54.
28. Id. at 654 (footnote omitted).
29. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1938), construed in Kordel, supra note 25, at 2.
30. 424 U.S. at 654.
31. 317 U.S. 424 (1943). The Court cites Monia as supporting in dictum its
holding in Garner. See supra note 26.
32. 15 U.S.C. 32 (1903), as amended by 15 U.S.C. 33 (1906), construed in United
States v. Monia, supra note 26, at 425-426.
1148
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without claiming his privilege against self-incrimination or the immun-
ity conferred by the Act.3 The Court held that because of the immun-
ity conferred by the Act, the defendants could not be prosecuted, regard-
less of whether they had claimed the privilege or the immunity.3 Al-
though the decision was based upon statutory immunity, the Court, in
Garner, quoted dictum from Monia to support its conclusion that Gar-
ner was not compelled to incriminate himself:
The [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. It does not preclude a
witness from testifying voluntarily in matters which may incriminate him.
If, therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it
or he will not be considered to have been "compelled" within the meaning
of the Amendment.34
The Court pointed out in Garner3 ' that Kordel and the older wit-
ness cases,3 7 which require that the privilege be asserted, accommodate
the competing interests of the individual's right to remain silent on the
one hand, and the government's right to everyone's testimony on the
other hand. Since the witness is the only one who knows whether the
government is compelling him to make incriminating disclosures, the,
burden is properly on him to make a timely assertion of the privilege:3'
"If, instead, he discloses the information sought, any incriminations
properly are viewed as not compelled." 3'
3. CIRCUIT JUDGE KOELSCH
AND "IMPLIED WAIVER"
Circuit Judge Koelsch, in his majority opinion following the first
hearing in Garner by the Ninth Circuit, rejected the premise that the
33. The immunity from prosecution for witnesses testifying under the Sherman
Act was conferred by the Act of Feb. 25, 1903, ch. 775, § 1, 32 Stat. 904, which reads,
in part: "[N]o person shall be prosecuted or be subjected to any penalty of forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify
or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, in any proceeding, suit, or prosecution
under [the Sherman Act]."
34. 317 U.S. at 430.
35. 424 U.S. at 654-55 (citation omitted).
36. Id. at 655.
37. See Mason v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 364-65 (1917); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 668 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-45
(1972).
38. 424 U.S. at 655.
39. Id.
5
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privilege was "impliedly waived" by Garner because he failed to assert
it in the returns. 0 At the first hearing, the government relied on Stillman
v. United States." In that case Hyman Stillman and his partner, who
were in the wholesale meat business, were convicted of violating the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.42 At their trial the government
had introduced, over their Fifth Amendment objections, their individual
and partnership income tax returns. The Court stated:
If appellants believed that certain declarations in their tax returns might
incriminate them they could have refrained from making the voluntary
tax declarations here in evidence. However, they chose to report the illicit
income rather than risk possible prosecution for making false or incom-
plete returns covering such income. The disclosures upon the tax returns
must therefore be deemed to have been voluntarily entered upon a public
record."O
Circuit Judge Koelsch interpreted the Stillman decision as based on an
"implied waiver" of the privilege." He cited Marchetti v. United
States" as a "recent constitutional development" which had "eliminated
the doctrinal keystone" of the Stillman decision." In Marchetti the
petitioner was convicted of failure to register as a gambler with the
Internal Revenue Service, as required by I.R.C. § 4412,47 and of conspir-
acy to evade payment of a gambler's occupational tax as required by
I.R.C. § 441 1.48 He contended that these statutory requirements violated
his privilege against self-incrimination, since his wagering activities were
40. The Supreme Court in the Garner opinion makes it clear that the term
"waiver" should be limited to those cases where "one affirmatively renounces the pro-
tection of the privilege." While rejecting the concept of waiver in name, the Court, by
its holding in Garner, extends the implied waiver reasoning to incriminating disclosures
made in tax returns. 424 U.S. at 654 n.9.
41. 177 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1949).
42. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23.
43. 177 F.2d at 618.
44. 501 F.2d at 231.
45. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
46. 501 F.2d at 231.
47. I.R.C. § 4412 provides that: "Each person required to pay a special tax under
this subchapter shall register with the official in charge of the internal revenue district
... his name and place of residence. . ....
48. 1.R.C. § 4411 reads, in part: "There shall be imposed a special tax of $50 per
year to be paid by each person who is liable [to pay the excise tax on wagers as provided
by § 44011" (fine increased to $500 per year, as amended by Pub.L. No. 93-499, § 3(b),
88 Stat. 1550. See note 65, infra.
1150
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in violation of state and federal law. The Court held that the petitioner
did not lose the protection of the privilege by his failure to assert it when
the tax payments were due, and that he properly invoked the privilege
at trial." Circuit Judge Koelsch was apparently saying that Marchetti
so eroded the concept of implied waiver of the privilege that Stillman,
which he concluded was based on implied waiver, was no longer effective
law. Since Stillman and implied waiver were no longer viable, he con-
cluded that Garner did not lose the benefit of the privilege by disclosing
the incriminating information.
In his opinion, Circuit Judge Koelsch overlooked two important
aspects of the relation of Marchetti to the Stillman case and Garner's
situation. First, the Court in Marchetti made clear that the status of the
group with which the petitioner was identified was a major factor in the
holding that the privilege was not waived by failure to invoke it. The
Court found that "wagering is an area permeated with criminal statutes,
and those engaged in wagering are a group inherently suspect of crimi-
nal activities. '"" Because petitioner, as a gambler, was a member of a
"suspect group," any response he might make pursuant to I.R.C. §§
4411 and 4412 would be self-incriminating. The Court distinguished the
situation of the taxpayer, who is required to file tax returns, from that
of a gambler, who is required to register, by concluding that "[u]nlike
the income tax return. . . every portion of [the section 4411 and 4412]
requirements had the direct and unmistakable consequence of incrimi-
nating petitioner ... ."31 The reasoning used in Marchetti to preclude
an implied waiver of the privilege by gamblers does not apply to non-
suspect groups such as taxpayers. So Circuit Judge Koelsch's reliance
on Marchetti as eroding the doctrinal keystone of Stillman, viz., implied
waiver, seems misplaced.
Second, in Marchetti the petitioner did not disclose any incriminat-
ing information, as did Garner and Stillman. Indeed, the holding of
Stillman is based upon the fact that the information in question was
disclosed in lieu of claiming the privilege. If Stillman had withheld the
information, as did Marchetti, he might not have lost the benefit of the
privilege. 2 This basic difference between the two fact patterns prevents
49. 390 U.S. at 50-51.
50. Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 48-49.
52. Stillman, however, would have exposed himself to an I.R.C. § 7203 prosecu-
tion if he had failed to file a return or had withheld information. Marchetti, on the other
hand, was allowed to exercise his privilege by simply failing to file, since he was the
member of a group "inherently suspect of criminal activities."
7
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Marchetti from supporting the conclusion that implied waiver has no
place where the Fifth Amendment privilege is involved.
Circuit Judge Koelsch concluded by holding that I.R.C. § 72033
compelled Garner to make the disclosures in question, and that by
submitting to such statutory compulsion, Garner did not waive his right
to assert his privilege at trial.M
4. GARNER'S THREE ARGUMENTS
Garner resisted the application of the general rule that witnesses
must claim the privilege, arguing that in the tax return context incrimi-
nating disclosures made in returns are "compelled."O He relied on three
situations in which incriminating disclosures had been considered com-
pelled despite a failure to claim the privilege."
A. Coerced Confeasion Cames:
Knowing and Intolligent Waiver
First, Garner argued that for one to lose the benefit of the privilege
there must be a knowing and intelligent waiver, even though one did not
claim the privilege prior to disclosure. 7 He relied on coerced confession
cases, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona.M In Miranda, the defendant was taken
into custody in connection with a kidnapping and rape. Without being
informed of his Fifth Amendment privilege, Miranda was interrogated
,by the police for two hours in a special interrogation room. He signed
a written confession which was admitted as evidence at his trial, and he
was subsequently convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion, holding that Miranda had not been effectively apprised of his
privilege against self-incrimination, nor had he knowingly and intelli-
gently waived it.
The Court, in Garner," refused to extend the Miranda holding to
disclosures made in tax returns. Miranda dealt with custodial interroga-
tion, a situation necessarily fraught with compulsion to disclose incrimi-
nating information. These dangers are not present in the tax return
53. See supra note 7.
54. 501 F.2d at 232-33.
55. 424 U.S. at 656.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 657.
58. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
59. 424 U.S. at 657-58.
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 12
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol1/iss1/12
i:i977
context, and the extraordinary safeguard of requiring a knowing and
intelligent waiver was not adopted. The Court stated:
[N]othing in this case suggests the need for a similar presumption that a
taxpayer makes disclosures on his return rather than claims the privilege
because his will is overborne. In fact, a taxpayer, who can complete his
return at leisure and with legal assistance, is even less subject to the
psychological pressures at issue in Miranda than a witness who has been
called to testify in judicial proceedings."
B. Garner Argued Mackey v. United States
Second, Garner relied on Mackey v. United States,61 Marchetti v.
United States, 2 and Grosso v. United States." In Mackey, the defen-
dant was convicted in 1964 of evading payment of income taxes for the
years 1956 through 1960.64 At his trial the government introduced into
evidence sixty wagering excise tax returns which he had filed pursuant
to I.R.C. § 4401," to prove that this was his actual income which he had
reported during the years in question. Subsequent to Mackey's convic-
tion the Supreme Court held, in Marchetti and Grosso, that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was a valid defense for failure to comply with §§
4401, 4411, and 4412," which require a gambler to 'egister and pay an
occupational and excise tax. After Marchetti and Grosso were decided,
Mackey filed a motion to set aside his conviction. The Court in
Mackey 7 refused to apply Marchetti and Grosso retroactively to over-
turn Mackey's conviction. Garner argued that if Mackey had made the
incriminating disclosures after the Marchetti and Grosso decisions, such
disclosures could not have been used against him." Garner further
argued that since Mackey would have been privileged to file no return,
60. Id.
61. 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
62. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
63. 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
64. Mackey was convicted of violating I.R.C. § 7201, which reads, in part: "Any
person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by this
title or the payment thereof shall ... be guilty of a felony. .. ."
65. I.R.C. § 4401 reads, in pertinent part: "There shall be imposed on wagers.
an excise tax equal to 10 percent of the amount thereof."
66. See supra notes 47, 48, and 65.
67. 401 U.S. at 674.
68. 424 U.S. at 659.
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any disclosures made would have also been privileged. 9 He concluded
that Mackey stood for the proposition that "an objection at trial always
suffices to preserve the privilege even if disclosures have been made
previously."7 0 The Court did not find this reasoning compelling, and
stated: "[lilt does not follow necessarily that a taxpayer would be immu-
nized against use of disclosures made on gambling tax returns when the
Fifth Amendment would have justified a failure to file at all."'"
The Court did not find Garner in a situation similar to Marchetti
and Grosso, even though all were gamblers required to file tax returns.7
I.R.C. §§ 4401, 4411, and 4412 required Marchetti and Grosso to file
tax returns which were for gamblers only. Since gamblers were members
of a group "inherently suspect of criminal activities" any response by
them would be self-incriminating. 3 The Court distinguished Garner's
situation by pointing out that federal income tax returns are not directed
at suspect groups.7' The Court cited Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board5 as authority for distinguishing federal income tax tax-
payers from gamblers required to file tax returns under I.R.C. §§ 4401,
4411, and 4412. In Albertson, the petitioners, who were members of the
Communist Party, were ordered by the Subversive Activities Control
Board to register with the Attorney General, as required by the Subver-
sive Activities Control Act of 1950.11 Upon review of these orders, the
Court held that, because petitioners were members of a "highly selective
group inherently suspect of criminal activities" and were involved in an
"area permeated with criminal statutes," any response they might make
pursuant to the statute would be self-incriminating, and in violation of
their privilege.77 The Court, in Albertson, distinguished federal income
tax returns from the Communist registration requirement by holding
that tax returns are "neutral on their face and directed at the public at
large."7 8 The Garner Court used this reasoning to distinguish the gam-
bler's tax return from income tax returns.7 The Court concluded:
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. n. 13.
72. Id. at 660.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 382 u.s. 70 (1965).
76. Acts of Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, § 7, 64 Stat. 993; July 29, 1954, ch. 646, 68
Stat. 586, amending 50 U.S.C. § 786 (d).-
77. 382 U.S. at 79.
78. Id.
79. 424 U.S. at 660-61.
10
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"[Tihe great majority of persons who file income tax returns do not
incriminate themselves by disclosing their occupation. The requirement
that such returns be completed and filed simply does not involve the
compulsion considered in Mackey. "m
C. Section 7203: Compulsion to Incriminate
Finally, Garner argued that a taxpayer who claims the privilege on
his return is threatened with prosecution under I.R.C. § 7203 for failure
to make a return or supply information,"' and that this possibility of
prosecution compelled him to make incriminating disclosures rather
than claim the privilege.12 To support his argument Garner relied on
Garrity v. New Jersey,3 in which the appellants, who were police offi-
cers, were questioned in connection with a state investigation of alleged
traffic ticket fixing. Each was warned before questioning that if he
refused to answer he would be subject to removal from office pursuant
to a state statute.u The police officers answered the questions, and their
answers were used against them in a subsequent prosecution for conspir-
ing to obstruct the administration of traffic laws. The appellants ob-
jected to the use of their incriminating answers, claiming that they had
been compelled to answer. The Court concluded that the appellants had
been forced to choose between "self-incrimination or job forfeiture"' '
and held that statements coerced by threat of removal from office could
not be used against the officers in a subsequent criminal proceedingM
Garner argued that the threat of an I.R.C. § 7203 prosecution, like the
threat of removal from office in Garrity, compelled him to make incrim-
inating disclosures instead of claiming the privilege." But the Court
distinguished Garrity, pointing out that Garrity was threatened with
reprisal for a valid exercise of the privilege, while Garner was not so
80. Id. at 661 (footnote omitted).
81. See supra note 7.
82. 424 U.S. at 661.
83. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
84. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:81-17.1 (Supp. 1965) provides, in part: "Any person
holding ... public office, position or empoyment ... who refuses to testify upon
matters relating to the office, position or employment in any criminal proceeding...
upon the ground that his answer may tend to incriminate him or compel him to be a
witness against himself ... shall be removed therefrom ......
85. 385 U.S. at 496.
86. Id. at 500.
87. 424 U.S. at 661.
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threatened, since "a § 7203 conviction cannot be based on a valid exer-
cise of the privilege."" The Court expanded this holding in a footnote:
"[Blecause § 7203 proscribes 'willful' failures to make returns, a tax-
payer is not at peril for every erroneous claim of privilege. The Govern-
ment recognizes that a defendant could not properly be convicted for
an erroneous claim of privilege asserted in good faith."89
The Court cited United States v. Murdock" (Murdock 1) as estab-
lishing that a taxpayer, prosecuted for willful failure to supply informa-
tion, is not entitled to a preliminary ruling on the validity of his claim
of privilege," and United States v. Murdock92 (Murdock II) as support-
ing the conclusion that an erroneous, good faith claim of the privilege
is a defense to a § 7203 prosecution. 3 In Murdock I the appellee
claimed deductions for money paid to others in his 1927 and 1928
income tax returns. The Internal Revenue Service requested informa-
tion concerning these deductions. Murdock refused to answer, claiming
his privilege against self-incrimination. He was thereafter prosecuted for
willful failure to supply information under the predecessor to § 7203.94
The Court held that Murdock could be prosecuted for willful failure to
supply information without prior determination as to whether his claim
of privilege was valid.'5 Murdock was subsequently convicted for with-
holding information. In Murdock II the Court reversed the conviction,
holding that a good faith misunderstanding" as to the applicability of
88. Id. at 662.
89. Id. at 663 n. 18. The Court's holding was apparently that a valid exercise of
the privilege was a defense to a § 7203 prosecution. This would seem to imply that an
invalid exercise of the privilege would not be a defense. But in n. 18 the Court pointed
out, without so holding, the government's concession, that an invalid, good faith claim
of privilege would preclude a § 7203 conviction. In a concurring opinion, discussed
below, Justice Marshall argues that to satisfy the Fifth Amendment an erroneous, good
faith claim of the privilege must be allowed as a defense.
90. 284 U.S. 141 (1931).
91. 424 U.S. at 664-65.
92. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
93. 424 U.S. at 662-63 and n. 18.
94. Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 1114(a), 44 Stat. 116. This section is essentially
the same as § 7203. It provides, in pertinent part: "Any person required under this Act
to pay any tax. . . to make a return, keep any records, or supply any information...
who willfully fails to pay such tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such
information . . . shall . . . be guilty of a misdemeanor."
95. 284 U.S. at 148.
96. Murdock erroneously believed that the Fifth Amendment privilege protected
him from making disclosures incriminating under state law when pressed for informa-
tion in a federal forum. It was not established until Murdock I. that one being ques-
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the privilege could not be the basis of a conviction for willfully failing
to supply information. 7
In Garner, the Court reaffirmed the decision of Murdock II, hold-
ing that a taxpayer cannot be convicted of a § 7203 violation if he makes
a good faith, though erroneous, claim of privilege." It also reaffirmed
the holding of Murdock 1,11 stating: "a § 7203 prosecution., may be
brought without a preliminary judicial ruling on a claim of privilege that
would allow a taxpayer to reconsider."00
Justice Marshall, troubled by the Court's reasoning, filed a concur-
ring opinion, in which Justice Brennan joined. The majority had stated:
"[S]ince a valid claim of privilege cannot be the basis for a § 7203
conviction, Garner can prevail only if the possibility that a claim made
on the return will be tested in a criminal prosecution suffices in itself
deny him freedom to claim the privilege."'' The Court concluded:
As long as a valid and timely claim of privilege is available as a defense
to a taxpayer prosecuted for failure to make a return, the taxpayer has
not been denied a free choice to remain silent merely because of the
absence of a preliminary judicial ruling on his-claim."0
The concurring Justices interpreted the majority opinion as holding that
a valid claim of privileged defense, without more, satisfies the Constitu-
tion.0 3 The Justices were adamant in their belief that only if a good
faith, invalid assertion of the privilege entitles a taxpayer to acquittal
under § 7203, then a threat of prosecution could not compel incriminat-
ing disclosures in violation of the Fifth Amendment.'
Although the concurring justices accepted the majority's holding
that a preliminary ruling is not a prerequisite to a § 7203 prosecution,
they believed that the absence of a preliminary ruling was important in
determining whether Garner had been compelled."' They felt that a
tioned in a federal forum could not refuse to answer because of possible incrimination
under state law. The Court disapproved of this holding in Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
97. 290 U.S. at 396.
98. 424 U.S. at 662-63 and n. 18.
99. Id. at 664-65.
100. Id. at 664.
101. Id. at 663.
102. Id. at 665 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 666-67.
104. Id. at 666.
105. Id. at 667.
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taxpayer must either be given a preliminary ruling or be allowed a
defense of good faith assertion of the privilege. If the taxpayer was not
afforded at least one of these safeguards, he would be denied the free
choice to claim the privilege. Marshall concluded: "[O]nly because a
good faith erroneous claim of privilege entitles a taxpayer to acquittal
under § 7203 can I conclude that [Garner's] disclosures are admissible
against him."'"
5. CONCLUSION
Garner v. United States reaffirmed the rule of Sullivan, that a
taxpayer must file a return, even though his income is derived from
illegal activities. Garner reasserted the holding of Marchetti, that one
who is the member of a group inherently suspect of criminal activities
need not comply with a statutory requirement to disclose information
relating to those activities. A federal income tax taxpayer is not in a
suspect group and must file a return. If a question in the return requires
an incriminating answer, the taxpayer must withhold the information
and assert his privilege in the return to obtain its protection. If the
taxpayer discloses the information instead of claiming the privilege, he
has not been compelled to incriminate himself and the incriminating
information may be used against him in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion of a non-tax-related offense. If the taxpayer asserts the privilege
instead of disclosing the information, he can be prosecuted under I.R.C.
§ 7203 for failure to supply required information, and he will not be
entitled to a preliminary ruling on whether his claim is valid. If the
taxpayer's claim of privilege is asserted in good faith, it will be a defense
to a § 7203 prosecution, even if his claim is invalid.
In Garner, the Supreme Court has moved toward allowing a pen-
alty to be extracted for the exercising of one's privilege against self-
incrimination. Under the Garner decision a taxpayer can be prosecuted
for withholding incriminating information without a preliminary hear-
ing on whether his claim of privilege is valid. A criminal prosecution
for asserting one's privilege would seem to be the kind of reprisal con-
demned in Garrity. The trend of the Court is toward allowing the asser-
tion of the privilege in a tax return context to become more perilous, in
order to allow the government to proceed in its endless quest for more
information concerning its citizens.
David F. Vedder
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